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OPENNESS AT THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION:  
TOPPLING A TABOO 
 
ALBERTO ALEMANNO and OANA STEFAN* 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Despite the pervasive rhetoric of transparency in the EU, the openness of the Court of Justice 
has received little attention. Openness consists of various forms of active cooperation and 
communication between the EU institutions and the public. While the Court has consistently 
guaranteed the principles of transparency of judicial proceedings and publicity of trial vis-à-vis 
the parties (stemming from Art. 6 ECHR), it has not provided a similar level of “openness” 
beyond this. By establishing that openness applies essentially to the work of the executive and 
legislative, the Court emphasized the specificity of its judicial task. This article examines to what 
extent the public is informed or may obtain information concerning the activity of the Court, 
paying due regard to the distinction made in Article 15 TFEU between administrative and 
judicial tasks. It argues that Article 15(1) requires rendering all the activities of the Court more 
open. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Openness is a principle that has progressively been integrated in European law,1 first through the 
decisions of the Court in relation to the right of access to documents and then, after the 1990s, 
through Treaty amendments2 and secondary legislation.3 Currently enshrined in Article 1 TEU 
(“decisions are taken as openly as possible and as closely as possible to the citizen”) and 15 
TFEU (the institutions “shall conduct their work as openly as possible”), the principle of 
openness consists essentially of various forms of active cooperation and communication between 
the EU institutions and the public, typically entailing access to information.4 A very important 
component of the principle is transparency, of which the most concrete manifestation is the right 
                                                          
* Alberto Alemanno is Jean Monnet Professor in EU Law and Risk Regulation, HEC Paris and Global Clinical 
Professor, New York University School of Law. Oana Stefan is Senior Lecturer in Public and European Law, King’s 
College London. We are grateful to the judges, advocates general, référendaires and officials at the EU Courts for 
generously sharing their personal thoughts on some of the issues with us. We thank Michal Bobek (College of 
Europe), Giuseppe Martinico (CEPS), Philipp Speitler (EFTA Court), Alessandro Spina (EMA) and the anonymous 
reviewers for comments on a previous draft and Daniel Sarmiento (CJEU) for inspiring discussions over the years. 
Cliff Wirajendi’s and Adam Jaffee’s research assistance is appreciated. All errors and omissions remain the sole 
responsibility of the authors 
1 See on this point, Bugaric, “Openness and transparency in public administration: Challenges for public law”, 22 
Wis. Int. Law J. (2004), 487 et seq; and for a comparative perspective of the principle, see Ziller, “European models 
of government: Towards a patchwork with missing pieces”, 54 Parliamentary Affairs (2001), 102-119. 
2 See Art. 1(2) TEU. 
3 Regulation (EC) No. 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2001 regarding public 
access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents, O.J. 2001, L 145/43. 
4 Craig, EU Administrative Law (OUP, 2012), at p. 357 (who argues that transparency encompasses a number of 
different features, such as holding of meetings in public, the provision of information and the right of access to 
documents) and Bugaric, “Openness and transparency in public administration”, op. cit. supra note 1. 
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of access to documents.5 This represents by far the most developed legal dimension of openness, 
having been elaborated through secondary legislation, in particular Regulation 1049/2001,6 
which is currently under revision.7 
 After famously pioneering the inclusion of openness among the principles of European 
law8 and actively imposing its respect for all EU institutions,9 the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (hereinafter CJEU)10 has shown circumspection with regard to extending the 
application of the principle to its own activities in the name of the specificity of the judicial 
process. In particular, the CJEU’s stance seems motivated by the concern to preserve the serenity 
of its proceedings while discharging its duties of dicere legem. Thus, while the EU Courts have 
fully guaranteed access to the court file and publicity of trial as applicable to the parties of a case 
under Article 6 ECHR, different, lower, and still largely undefined standards of openness appear 
to be used with regard to the general public, i.e. to individuals not involved in judicial 
activities.11 
 An important development in this area occurred recently, when a decision was published 
on public access to documents held by the CJEU in the exercise of its administrative functions.12 
While this decision will undoubtedly enhance openness of the non-judicial activity of the Court, 
some further steps in this direction would be welcome. Thus, for instance, the current 
presumption that third-party access to Court submissions undermines the protection of judicial 
proceedings appears difficult to reconcile with the imperative of openness.13 Moreover, despite 
                                                          
5 Levitt, “Access to the file: The Commission's administrative procedures in cases under Articles 85 and 86”, 34 
CML Rev. (1997), 1413 et seq; Curtin, “Citizens' fundamental right of access to EU information: An evolving 
digital passepartout”, 37 CML Rev. (2000), 7 et seq; Curtin and Meijer, “Does transparency strengthen 
legitimacy?”, 11 Information Polity (2006), 109 et seq; Peers, “The new regulation on access to documents: A 
critical analysis”, 21 YEL (2002), 385 et seq; Broberg, “Access to documents: A general principle of Community 
law”, 27 EL Rev. (2002), 194; De Leeuw, “The regulation on public access to European Parliament, Council and 
Commission documents in the European Union: Are citizens better off?”, 28 EL Rev. (2002), 324. 
6 Regulation (EC) No. 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2001 regarding public 
access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents, O.J. 2001, L 145/43. 
7 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council amending Regulation (EC) No. 1049/2001 
regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents, 30 April 2008, 
COM(2008)229 final, 2008/0090(COD). 
8 In particular, the first legal recognition of “transparency” derived from the administrative right of access to file, 
which aims at securing the right to be heard, was developed in competition law well before it made its entry into EU 
law as a general constitutional right of access to documents. See e.g. Prechal and de Leeuw, “Transparency: A 
general principle of European law?” in Bernitz, Nergelius and Cardner (Eds.), General Principles of EC Law in a 
Process of Development (Kluwer, 2008), 201-242; Settembri, “Transparency and the EU legislator”, 43 JCMS 
(2005), 637-654, at 639; Curtin, op. cit. supra note 5. 
9 See e.g. Case C-260/04, Commission v Italy, [2007] ECR I-7083. 
10 In general, this Review still uses the informal abbreviation “ECJ” to refer to the European Court of Justice. In the 
present article, however, a careful distinction is made between the Court as an institution and the judicial body 
known as the Court of Justice. For that reason, the abbreviation CJEU is here used to refer to the institution. Unless 
specified otherwise, in this article the term Court (or also EU Courts) refers – in line with Art. 19 TEU – to the Court 
of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) as encompassing the Court of Justice (CJ), the General Court (GC) as well 
as the Civil Service Tribunal (CST). 
11 It must be observed that the duty of transparency imposed on the EU judiciary towards the parties to the dispute 
stems from the general principle of access to justice and its related procedural rights, not from the transparency 
provisions contained in the Treaties. The latter provisions create instead a set of rights to the benefit of the general 
public. 
12 Decision of the Court of Justice of the European Union of 11 Dec. 2012 concerning public access to documents 
held by the Court of Justice of the European Union in the exercise of its administrative functions (2013/C 38/02). 
13 See infra 4.1.2. 
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having been “the unsung hero of those seeking to open up the inner institutional workings of the 
EU”,14 the Court fails to render its hearings more accessible by not retransmitting them. 
Moreover, while the outcome of decisions regarding the internal functioning of the Court15 is 
generally brought to the public’s attention through adequate forms of publication, the underlying 
processes are not. Finally, the CJEU’s archives are closed to the public and no known policy 
governs their access.16 
 Despite the growing public sensitivity to institutional openness, such issues seem to have 
largely escaped institutional attention and academic scrutiny.17 This appears to be an exception in 
the “dominant Court-centred work in EC law scholarship”,18 but is also a symptom of a deeper 
phenomenon, which was effectively depicted by Joseph Weiler when he sarcastically wrote that 
the custodians of the EU legal order, as lawyers, were a “conservative bunch”.19 Indeed, as 
openness and transparency progressively became the modern buzzwords in debates on 
accountability and legitimacy of non-elected organizations,20 they quickly became a taboo 
subject both within21 and outside the EU judiciary.22 From an institutional perspective it was 
observed that the Court recently entered an era of “bewildering silence”,23 lacking a policy of 
openness with regard to its internal functioning. From an academic point of view, the established 
transparency studies have focused mainly on the way in which the Court helped to introduce the 
principle within the EU legal order and encouraged its application to the executive body.24 The 
                                                          
14 Heliskoski and Leino, “Darkness at the break of noon: The case law on Regulation 1049/2001 on access to 
documents”, 43 CML Rev. (2006), 735-781. 
15 These involve, among others, the procedures regarding the composition of the chambers, or governing the 
allocation of the cases among judges. See e.g. 254 TFEU and Art. 16 (CJ), Art. 50 (GC) of the Statute and Annex to 
the Statute (CST). 
16 The Historical Archives of the European Union (HAEU) report that more than 3,500 linear meters of archives 
have been sent from the various EU institutions to their headquarters in Fiesole, Italy, by annual shipment. While 
file transfers are expected to increase in view of the HAEU’s mission to provide a single preservation and access 
point for research on primary sources for all the EU institutions, the Court’s archives have not yet been transferred 
to the HAEU. See <www.eui.eu/HAEU/Lfonds/ec.asp> (last visited 15 Nov. 2013). 
17 The only exception is offered by those contributions written extrajudicially by some members of the Court, see 
e.g. Jacobs, “Recent and ongoing measures to improve the efficiency of the European Court of Justice”, 29 EL Rev. 
(2004), 823-830; Timmermans, “The European Union’s judicial system”, 41 CML Rev. (2004), 393-405; Lenaerts, 
“The rule of law and the coherence of the judicial system of the European Union”, 44 CML Rev. (2007), 1625-1659; 
Vesterdorf, “La nomination des juges de la Cour de justice de l’Union européenne”, 3 CDE (2011), at 601; Rosas 
and Armati, EU Constitutional Law: An Introduction (Hart, 2012), pp. 138 et seq. 
18 Introduction, in Shaw and More (Eds.), New Legal Dynamics of European Union (OUP, 1995). 
19 Weiler, “Epilogue”, in De Búrca and Weiler, The European Court of Justice (OUP, 2001), at p. 215. 
20 Seim, “By what authority? The legitimacy and accountability of non-governmental organizations”, paper 
delivered at The International Council on Human Rights Policy International Meeting on Global Trends and Human 
Rights — Before and after September 11, Geneva, 10-12 Jan., available at <www.jha.ac/articles/a082.htm> (last 
visited 15 Nov. 2013).  
21 As denounced by Sharpston, “Transparency and clear legal language in the European Union: Ambiguous 
legislative texts, laconic pronouncements and the credibility of the judicial system”, 12 CYELS (2010), 409-423. 
22 See e.g. Anderson, “Transparent virtue: Secrecy in the courts: At the tipping point?”, 53 Villanova Law Review 
(2008), 811 et seq., and, more recently, see Open Society Justice Initiative, Report on Access to Judicial 
Information, March 2009, at <www.right2info.org> (last visited 15 Nov. 2013). 
23 Rasmussen, “Present and future European judicial problems after enlargement and the post-2005 ideological 
revolt”, 44 CML Rev. (2007), 1661 et seq, at 1687. 
24 Lenaerts, “‘In the Union we trust’: Trust – enhancing principles of Community law”, 41 CML Rev. (2004), 317 et 
seq, at 318-319. See also on the principle of transparency Lodge, “Transparency and democratic legitimacy”, 32 
JCMS (1994), at 343; Curtin, “Betwixt and between: Democracy and transparency in the governance of the 
European Union”, in Winter et al. (Eds.), Reforming the Treaty on European Union: The Legal Debate (Kluwer, 
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rich and evergreen literature on the EU judicial system does not seem to have explored the 
application of openness and transparency to the CJEU’s own activity, with some exceptions,25 
thus further consolidating the taboo. 
 Amid the latest institutional reforms, the taboo has been gradually toppled. Indeed, 
Article 15 TFEU expressly extends the application of the principle of openness to the work of the 
CJEU,26 yet not without carving out some notable exceptions aimed at sheltering from the reach 
of the public the Court’s inner mission: the judicial proceedings and the documents produced 
therein. As a result, Courts are subject to the duty of transparency regarding proceedings and 
documents “only when exercising their administrative tasks”.27 Given this new legal framework, 
the following analysis aims at evaluating to what extent the public is informed or may obtain 
information concerning the activity of the EU Courts. The article acknowledges that certain 
actors might have supplementary needs from the point of view of transparency. Such are the 
parties to the trial, to which higher standards of openness apply in order to ensure proper 
administration of justice. Likewise, the cooperation between the CJEU and national courts – 
which has been instrumental for EU integration – needs open and effective communication 
adapted to the requirements of the judicial tasks accomplished by these institutions. While noting 
such specificities, this article focuses mainly on general standards, applicable to the general 
public interpreted widely: institutions, the media, academics, businesses, and individuals.  
 In section 2, we briefly reconstruct the evolution of the principles of openness and 
transparency and provide an assessment of their respective normative content by closely 
examining their textual bases, while taking into due account their specificities when applied to 
judicial activities. Sections 3 and 4 determine what information and which activities are currently 
open to the public, while paying due regard to the regulatory distinction established by Article 15 
TFEU between the general level of openness that needs to be ensured institutionally and the 
limitations on transparency stemming from the specificities of judicial tasks. 
 
 
2. The normative framework 
 
Both openness and transparency are more often invoked than defined. While there is no single 
definition of the principle of openness or that of transparency in EU law, these terms are often 
used interchangeably to convey a common idea: the “opposite of opaqueness, complexity or even 
secretiveness”.28 The semantic confusion surrounding these two words, which has helped to 
muddy their normative differences, has to do with the way in which these principles have 
progressively been integrated into EU law.29 This section will first provide some clarifications, 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
1996); Peers, “From Maastricht to Laeken: The political agenda of openness and transparency in the EU”, in 
Deckmyn (Ed.), Increasing Transparency in the European Union (EIPA, 2002). 
25 Notable exceptions are Rasmussen, “Present and future European judicial problems after enlargement and the 
post-2005 ideological revolt” op. cit. supra note 23; Lasser, Judicial Deliberations: A Comparative Analysis of 
Judicial Transparency and Legitimacy (OUP, 2004), Sharpston, op. cit. supra note 21; Stone Sweet, “The European 
Court of Justice”, in Craig and De Burca, The Evolution of EU law (OUP, 2011), at p. 146. 
26 Leino, “Just a little sunshine in the rain: the 2010 case law of the European Court of Justice on access to 
documents”, 48 CML Rev. (2011), at 1220. 
27 Judgment in Joined Cases C-514/07, 528/07 & 532/07, API, [2010] ECR I-8533, para 81. 
28 Prechal and de Leeuw, op. cit. supra note 8, at p. 202. 
29 For an overview on the genesis and evolution of transparency in the EU, Bradley, “La transparence de l’Union 
européenne: une évidence ou un trompe d’œil”, (1999) CDE, at 283; Curtin and Meijer, op. cit. supra note 5. 
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while examining the normative content of the principles of openness and transparency. It will 
then move to examine the application of the principles in a judicial setting, in particular, the way 
in which they can be operationalized at the level of the EU Courts. 
 
2.1 Openness and transparency in EU law 
 
While the Amsterdam Treaty codified both principles, it is only the principle of transparency that 
had been fully applied at the time. This had occurred initially through the case law of the Court,30 
which recognized a right of access to file as a corollary of the procedural right to be heard. 
Subsequently, the Treaty of Amsterdam introduced via Article 255 EC a general right of public 
access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents, implemented through 
Regulation 1049/2001 and subject to further judicial development.31 
 However, in this initial stage of the evolution of thinking about openness /transparency, 
the EU institutions operationalized the principle exclusively with respect to access to documents 
and ensured it only passively, since they were not required to go beyond providing individuals 
with information when they specifically asked for it. The implementation of the principle of 
transparency as a right of access to documents was – and still remains – specific, unidirectional 
and bottom-up: its enjoyment requires that citizens actively demand a given piece of information 
from a given institution.  
 Yet the adoption of the White Paper on Governance generated a second, political stage in 
the evolution of the principle, with the Commission advocating transparency as a means to 
enhance legitimacy.32 The Commission placed “openness” alongside other “principles of good 
governance” values such as accountability and participation.33 As a result of this process, the 
openness principle – originally enshrined in Article 1 TEU and asserting that the Union’s 
institutions and bodies have to conduct their work “as openly as possible” – has been 
transformed by the Lisbon Treaty from a mere aspirational provision34 into a prescriptive one. In 
particular, by providing it with an autonomous normative content, Article 15 TFEU 
operationalizes the principle of openness by making it a judicially enforceable principle of law.35 
We argue that the resulting principle of openness encompasses today the principle of 
transparency as an important component (or corollary) that maintains its own autonomous 
normative content. Indeed, a quick look at the way in which these principles have evolved, their 
textual underpinnings,36 their rationale as well as the interests that they are aiming to protect, 
                                                          
30 Indeed, since the 1960s the CJEU recognized the right of access to the file as a part of the right of defence in the 
area of competition law. See e.g. Ragnelman, “The Community Courts and openness within the European Union”, 2 
CYELS (1999), 19-30; Vesterdorf, “Transparency – not just a vogue word”, Fordham Int. Law Journal (1999), 902-
929. 
31 Leino, op. cit. supra note 26, at 1220. 
32 For a critical overview on the relationship between transparency and legitimacy, see Curtin and Meijer, op. cit. 
supra note 5. 
33 Maher, “Transparency in the EU – An open and shut case”, 1 European Access (1997), 9-11. 
34 See on the lack of direct effect of the principle of openness, Curtin, “The fundamental principle of open decision-
making and EU (political) citizenship”, in Twomey and O’Keefe (Eds.), Legal Issues of the Amsterdam Treaty (Hart 
Publishing, 1999), pp. 71-91, at p. 72. See Case T-191/99, Petrie and Others v. Commission, [2001] ECR II-3677, 
paras. 34-38.  
35 This provision also replaces Art. 255 EC, which served as legal basis for the adoption of Regulation 1049/2001. 
36 In carving out an exception from the principle of transparency (transparency of proceedings and access to 
documents), Art. 15(3)(4), limits the applicability of this exception to “this paragraph,” i.e. Art. 15(3) dealing 
exclusively with the principle of transparency and not with the broader principle of openness. According to a 
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confirms that transparency no longer exhausts the normative content of openness, which today 
emerges as a self-standing principle.37 
 First of all, under Article 15(1), “the Union’s institutions, bodies, offices and agencies 
shall conduct their work as openly as possible”, “in order to promote good governance and 
ensure the participation of civil society”. This is clearly a more specific and more prescriptive38 
provision than Article 1 TEU. As a result, the principle of openness applies today to all EU 
institutions – including the CJEU – and imposes on them an autonomous duty to “open” their 
activities to the public.39 Thus, Article 15(2) provides that both the European Parliament and 
Council meet in public when considering and voting on draft legislative acts. Although this is the 
only Treaty effort to specifically translate the principle of openness into concrete application, it 
does not exhaust its normative content. Not only are all other institutions subject to the principle 
but they also need to proactively open their operations to the public. Although the contours of the 
principle of openness have not been fully defined, it is intuitive to believe that these tend to go 
well beyond a mere duty of holding public meetings and ensuring access to documents. This is 
confirmed by the fact that this new provision proves a shift from a regime that ensures openness 
as an end in itself to one that ensures openness as a means to obtain other goals, such as 
legitimacy and good governance.  
 Legitimacy has been historically linked to the need to inject openness and transparency 
into public administration, and the evolution of thinking on “transparency” has followed a 
similar path under EU law.40 According to political theory, providing citizens with the possibility 
to take part in, understand, feed and monitor the decision-making process may enhance the 
acceptability and overall legitimacy of the outcome of this process, as well as of the underlying 
institutional structures.41 The principle of openness – as enshrined in Article 15(1) TFEU – 
consists not only of the rather passive right of every citizen to have access to information but 
also of a more pro-active institutional duty to ensure that all its actions, as well as the 
information about these actions, are carried out in an accessible and understandable way.42 We 
believe that this reading is in line with the spirit of Article 15(1), since, as noted above, openness 
is viewed by the decision makers as a means to enhance the legitimacy of EU action, by 
promoting active participation. This is of course not to say that transparency can be a panacea to 
all legitimacy problems of the European Union. As rightfully pointed out by Curtin and Meijer, 
the assumptions linking transparency and input legitimacy, output legitimacy or social legitimacy 
are weak. That is because of various factors, such as information overload, proceduralization, 
and the risk that the media cherry-picks only information that highlights policy failures.43  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
contrario reading, the latter principle applies to the CJEU and the other institutions mentioned regardless of the 
nature of the activity it undertakes. 
37 Alemanno, “Unpacking the principle of openness under EU law: Transparency, participation and democracy”, EL 
Rev., forthcoming (2014). 
38 Given the use of the word “shall”. 
39 This interpretation – suggesting the existence of an autonomous normative content of the principle of openness – 
is confirmed by the wording of Art. 15(3)(4).  
40 Craig, op. cit. supra note 4, at p. 356; Curtin and Mendes, “Transparence et participation: des principes 
démocratiques pour l'administration de l'Union européenne”, (2011) Revue française d'administration publique, 
101-121; Rosendorff, Hollyer and Vreeland, “Democracy and transparency”, 73 The Journal of Politics (2001), 
1191-1205. 
41 See e.g. Curtin and Meijer, op. cit. supra note 5, at 111. 
42 Brandsma, Curtin and Meijer, “How transparent are EU comitology committees?”, 14 ELJ (2008), at 827; Craig, 
op. cit. supra note 4, at p. 359. 
43 Curtin and Meijer, “Does transparency strengthen legitimacy?”, op. cit. supra note 5. 
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 While Article 15(1) overhauled the principle of openness, endowing it with a broad 
normative meaning, Article 15(3) operationalizes its corollary, the principle of transparency, 
while providing it with an entirely new substantive and procedural framework. From a 
substantive point of view, Article 15(3) recognizes the existence of an autonomous citizen’s right 
of access to documents from all EU institutions, instead of just the Council, Commission and 
European Parliament, “whatever their medium”. From a procedural point of view, the second 
subparagraph entrusts the European Parliament and the Council with the authority to determine – 
“by means of regulations” – the “general principles and limits … governing this right of access 
to documents”. 
 Currently, Regulation 1049/2001 covers most EU institutions because either a separate 
legislative act has extended that Regulation to them or because they have adopted - on a 
voluntary basis - rules that guarantee access to their documents.44 A notable exception used to be 
the EU Courts, for which no rules had been adopted until the recent decision of the Court 
concerning public access to documents. The recent Court decision on access to administrative 
documents comes at the right moment since, after imposing on all EU institutions the obligation 
“to ensure that (their) proceedings are transparent”, Article 15 TFEU requires them to elaborate 
in their Rules of Procedure “specific provisions regarding access to documents, in accordance 
with the regulations” adopted by the European Parliament and the Council.  
 In conclusion, having largely overlapped with transparency until the adoption of the 
Lisbon Treaty, openness emerges today as a stand-alone, overarching principle including but not 
limited to transparency. While the latter principle is well known, as it consists essentially of 
ensuring access to the proceedings and documents, the essence of the openness principle is more 
obscure. 
 
2.2 Rationale and scope of openness at the CJEU level 
 
The application of the principle of openness to Court settings has long been considered as 
enhancing the protection of fundamental rights. In fact, judicial openness can be traced to the 
19th century writings of Bentham who advocated the “publicity” of trials and their accessibility 
to the general public.45 This principle, applied to criminal proceedings, was integrated in 
constitutions all over the world, and is also articulated in Article 6 of the ECHR. The publicity of 
trials does not concern only criminal cases,46 and it involves first and foremost open access to 
court proceedings and the possibility of individuals, interest groups and the press to attend court. 
Recent studies consider that the public can participate not only as spectators, but also actively, by 
making their own assessment of what happens in court and legitimizing or withdrawing 
legitimacy from the judicial body.47 In practice, this can increase (or decrease) trust in the 
judicial body. With regard to the debate on public access to pleadings in cases before the CJEU, 
academic research has pointed out that openness renders public debate about EU actions 
                                                          
44 The European Central Bank, the European Investment Bank, the European Court of Auditors, the European 
Economic and Social Committee, the Committee of the Regions as well as Europol and Eurojust have all adopted – 
on a voluntary basis – rules on access to their documents which are identical or similar to the Regulation. 
45 Bentham, “Chapter X – Of publicity and privacy, as applied to judicature in general, and to the collection of the 
evidence in particular”, in Tait (Ed.) The Works of Jeremy Bentham (1843), 351 et seq, at 355. 
46 Mulcahy, Legal Architecture: Justice, Due Process and the Place of Law (Routledge, 2011), at p. 85. 
47 Duff, Farmer, Marshall and Tadros, The Trial on Trial: Towards a Normative Theory of the Trial, Volume Three 
(Hart Publishing, 2007). 
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possible, thus increasing the legitimacy of these actions and the proper administration of 
justice.48 
 As mentioned in the previous section, we acknowledge the pitfalls of relying too much on 
transparency as a solution for legitimacy problems. At the same time, the need to translate this 
debate to the specificities of judicial settings needs to be highlighted. The judiciary typically 
presents different legitimatory credentials than the legislature.49 Here we tend to believe that a 
court is generally presumed to enjoy institutional legitimacy when the public regards it as a 
trustworthy decision-maker whose rulings deserve respect.50 The CJEU – like any other court – 
acts as an organism delegated by two parties to solve – though often indirectly – their dispute. 
According to its mission, it needs to preserve its neutrality in the eyes of each party to the case, 
but, in resolving the dispute, it will inevitably compromise this neutrality by declaring one party 
the loser.51 The legitimacy of judicial decisions depends thus to a large extent on the ability of 
the court to engage with all the arguments put forward by the parties to a case.52 By openly 
communicating the debate taking place between the parties, as well by clearly justifying its own 
position vis-à-vis both of them, the court creates the premises for the parties – and indeed for the 
wider public as well – to assess whether a certain judgment took into account all the arguments 
put forward in the case, and whether the law was observed. Of course, a court will be regarded as 
enjoying institutional legitimacy only if it manages, substantially, to acquire the respect and the 
trust of the citizens, by acting in accordance with the law. However, in order to undertake such 
an assessment of judicial quality, the parties and the general public must first and foremost have 
access to the arguments presented in the judgment, as well as to the debate that took place before 
the Court.53 Openness can thus be considered an important prerequisite that a diligent court 
needs to ensure in order to achieve institutional legitimacy.  
 Furthermore, through the preliminary ruling procedure, the Court is meant to assist 
national courts in the application of EU law. In this connection, it was pointed out that a policy 
of openness and communication might bolster the legitimacy of the Court vis-à-vis national 
courts. A smoother information flow between the CJ and national courts enhances mutual 
understanding and renders compliance with EU case law more feasible.54 Indeed, an open and 
transparent judiciary may serve not only to increase public knowledge about its judicial 
operation but also to bolster the accountability and legitimacy of its outputs.55  
 Following the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty and the re-writing of Article 255 EC, 
the principle of openness has acquired the status of an autonomous and legally enforceable 
principle.56 Therefore, even though it is undisputed that the judicial activity of the Court – being 
by definition non-administrative – is exempted from the safeguards of Article 15(3), this activity 
                                                          
48 See e.g. Adamski, “How wide is “the widest possible’? Judicial interpretation of the exceptions to the right of 
access to official documents revisited”, 46 CML Rev. (2009), 521 et seq, at 534. 
49 Habermas, Between Facts and Norms (MIT Press, 1996), p. 229 et seq. 
50 Fallon, “Legitimacy and the Constitution”, 118 Harvard Law Review (2005), 1789 et seq., at 1795. 
51 Stone Sweet, Governing with Judges: Constitutional Politics in Europe (OUP, 2000), at p. 15. 
52 Opinion of A.G. Maduro in API, cited supra note 27, para 34; see also Stone Sweet, op. cit. supra note 51, p. 16. 
53 See, on this point, von Bogdandy and Venzke, “In whose name? An investigation of International Courts' public 
authority and its democratic justification”, 23 EJIL (2012), 7-41. 
54 Bobek, “Of feasibility and silent elephants: the legitimacy of the Court of Justice through the eyes of national 
courts”, in Adams et al. (Eds.), Judging Europe’s Judges: The Legitimacy of the Case Law of the European Court of 
Justice Examined (Hart, 2013), pp. 197-234, at Section 4.a. 
55 Von Bogdandy and Venzke, op. cit. supra note 53, p. 26-27. 
56 Mendes, “Participation and the role of law after Lisbon: A legal view on Art. 11 TEU”, 48 CML Rev. (2011), at 
1849; Alemanno, op. cit. supra note 37. 
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does not escape all requirements imposed by the principle of openness. Indeed, by extending the 
principle of openness to the CJEU, Article 15(1) illustrates that there exists an autonomous area 
of openness that should be guaranteed regardless of the nature, administrative or non-
administrative, of the activity undertaken by the CJEU.57 The Court is set to gradually define this 
area when – on the basis of Article 15(1) TFEU – it will be asked to determine the precise 
normative content of the principle of openness.  
 It is against this backdrop that the next two sections assess how the activities of the EU 
Courts fare under the principle of openness. In so doing, the analysis introduces a fundamental 
distinction between the specific standard of transparency that needs to be observed with regard to 
the fulfilment of administrative tasks and the general standard of openness that applies to both 
the administrative side of the Court’s activities and its “judicial tasks”. Absent a detailed 
regulatory framework in this regard, we shall consider the general standard of openness as 
including public access to information, as well as the pro-active institutional duty to ensure that 
information about judicial activities is provided in an accessible and understandable way. Given 
the exception provided in Article 15 TFEU, due account has to be taken of the fact that 
transparency concerning certain proceedings or files can be lawfully subject to limitations. 
 
 
3. Openness at the administrative level 
 
Any attempt to define the scope of the principle of transparency as applicable to the EU Courts 
by virtue of Article 15(3) TFEU requires a preliminary categorization of their activities along 
two dimensions. The first has to do with their administrative tasks (the “court administration”) 
and is subject to the general rules of transparency. The second relates instead to non-
administrative tasks (the “court jurisdiction”) to which the transparency requirements do not 
apply. This section scrutinizes the extent to which the CJEU respects transparency in its 
administrative activities, which are thus subject to the general requirements of Article 15 TFEU. 
We consider the following activities to fall under the administrative (non-judicial) category: 
organizational functioning, human resources management, and ensuring infrastructure. 
 
3.1 The organizational functioning of the Court 
 
Due to its polysemic nature, the term “Court of Justice” as employed in the Treaties and Statute 
refers both to the umbrella organization encompassing the three jurisdictions as well as 
specifically to its highest instance. Consequently, the three Luxembourg courts share the same 
administrative apparatus, coordinated by the CJ Registrar, who ensures the direction of the 
departments,58 under the authority of the President.59 According to the Statute, officials and other 
servants attached to the CJEU are entrusted to render their services to the General Court (GC) by 
common accord between the Presidents of the two courts.60 Furthermore, the Annexe to the 
Statute provides that the Civil Service Tribunal (CST)61 is supported by the departments of the 
                                                          
57 Alemanno, op. cit. supra note 37. 
58 With the exception of the internal audit department, which is directly attached to the President. 
59 Arts. 10, 12 and 52 of the CJEU Statute. 
60 See Art. 52 of the Statute. 
61 For an initial analysis of the CST, Cameron, “Establishment of the European Union Civil Service Tribunal”, 5 The 
Law and Practice of International Courts and Tribunals (2006), 273-283. 
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Court of Justice and of the General Court.62 The CJ, the GC as well as the CST appoint their own 
Registrars.63 The administrative staff is responsible to the respective Registrars under the 
authority of the Presidents.64 It follows that transparency with regard to the organizational 
functioning of the Court depends both on the way in which the Registrars are appointed and on 
the way in which the administrative action is conducted by the departments of the Courts. 
 The process of appointing the Registrar was recently rendered more transparent by the 
new CJ Rules of Procedure.65 The new rules provide that a vacancy notice will be published in 
the Official Journal once the post of Registrar becomes available.66 Currently, the procedure 
leading to the appointment of the Registrar of the other two courts lacks the same level of 
publicity and overall transparency as that applied by the CJ. Their respective Rules of Procedure 
only mention that judges analyse and vote on applications received for the post of Registrar, and 
provide no information as to how these applications were generated.67 One may expect that these 
rules will at some point be aligned to those applicable to the appointment of the CJ’s Registrar.68 
In the same vein, while the organizational chart of the Court’s administrative apparatus provides 
brief information regarding the activities of each department, it contains little information on the 
persons in charge of the different activities, for instance who are the directors and officials in 
each division. As provided for in Article 12 of the Statute, officials and other servants, such as 
the référendaires acting as legal assistants to the judges, are appointed to the CJEU to enable it to 
function.69 Yet their identity is not disclosed and their appointment does not follow a common 
procedure being a prerogative of each member of the Court. All these officials answer to the 
Registrar of the Court, who in turn acts under the authority of the President of the relevant 
jurisdiction.70 The conditions under which officials and other servants of the CJEU render their 
services to the GC and CST respectively to enable them to function are determined by common 
accord by the CJ President, on the one hand, and the GC and CST Presidents, on the other.71 
Since appointments are essentially tasks of an administrative nature, one may expect these 
decisions to fall within the scope of Article 15 TFEU. Yet, there is no official list – unlike those 
available in virtually all other EU institutions, bodies and agencies – with the names and contact 
details of these officials, at least those whose activities affect third parties.72 Seen from the 
                                                          
62 See Art. 6 of Annex I of the Statute. 
63 As laid down in Arts. 253(5), 254(4) TFEU and Art. 6 of Council Decision of 2 Nov. 2004 establishing the 
European Union Civil Service Tribunal 2004/752/EC, O.J. 2004, L 333/7. 
64 Arts. 10, 12 and 52 of the CJEU Statute, and Art. 6 of Annex I of the Statute. 
65 Rules of Procedure of the CJ, O.J. 2012, L 265/1 in Art. 18. For an initial appraisal, Gaudissart, “La refonte du 
règlement de procedure de la Cour de justice”, 3 CDE (2012), 603-670. 
66 See Art. 18 of the Rules of Procedure of the CJ. 
67 Art. 20 of the Rules of Procedure of the GC and Art. 15 of the Rules of Procedure of CST. 
68 Communication with members of the cabinet of the GC President, 20/02/2013. 
69 The literature on the role of référendaires is scarce. However, one may refer to Kenney, “Beyond principals and 
agents: Seeing courts as organizations by comparing référendaires at the European Court of Justice and Law clerks 
at the U.S. Supreme Court”, 33 Comparative Political Studies (2000), 593-625; Grass, “Les ressources humaines à 
la Cour de justice des Communautés Européennes”, in Mélanges en l’Honneur de Philippe Léger. Le Droit à la 
Mesure de l’Homme (Pedone, 2006); and Johansson, “Les référendaires de la Cour de justice des Communautés 
européennes - Hommes et femmes de l'ombre?”, 3 Revue des Affaires Européennes ( 2007-2008), 563-568. 
70 See Arts. 12, 52 of the Statute and Art. 6 of Annex I to the Statute. 
71 See Art. 52 of the Statute and Art. 6 of Annex I to the Statute. 
72 The EU Whoiswho, the official directory of the European Union, does not report all officials employed by the 
CJEU, but merely some key actors, such as the members, their référendaires and the heads of services. The EFTA 
Court lists all officials on its website. See <www.eftacourt.int/the-court/members-staff/judges-and-staff/> (last 
visited 15 Nov. 2013). 
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perspective of the institutional obligation to actively ensure openness, the President and the 
Registrar of the Court should make all this information about the court staff available for the 
citizens. 
 Another shortcoming from the point of view of administrative openness relates to the fact 
that, while undoubtedly there is a hierarchy between, on the one hand, the Court of Justice and, 
on the other hand, the General Court and the Civil Service Tribunal,73 the modalities under 
which these institutional relations take place are largely unknown. While the EU Courts benefit 
from a single Statute, the Rules of Procedure applicable to each jurisdiction vary. This is, of 
course, understandable if one considers the differences in jurisdiction of the three courts. Yet this 
does not seem to justify the lack of harmonization of those rules governing the same procedural 
issue across the three courts that could be presented together in a single document. For instance, 
the rules concerning e-curia, an information technology application allowing the lodging and 
service of procedural documents by electronic means, although identical for the three Courts, are 
laid down in three separate decisions.74 Likewise, each of the three Courts published on their 
webpage different documents detailing the instructions for their respective Registrars – which 
have not been updated for the CJ since 1986.75 Although it is understandable to have different 
instructions for each Registrar, it is surprising that some of the rules relevant to all three Courts 
do not appear in all the instructions. This concerns the rules on third party access to case files, 
mentioned solely in the instructions to the GC Registrar, which we will examine below.  
 Overall, while the end result of administrative decision-making by the EU Courts is 
generally made available,76 a very limited amount of information related to the procedures that 
enable their organizational administrative functioning is accessible to the public. Indeed, one 
would expect publication in the Official Journal of information about the process through which 
organizational decisions have been taken and individual appointments have been made, e.g. as a 
member of a chamber77 or of an administrative committee. 
 What is more, under the new Rules of Procedure of the CJ, it is expressly established that 
decisions concerning administrative issues are discussed and taken at the general meeting in 
which all court members take part.78 Yet, as it emerges from the same provision, during this 
weekly meeting the Court also discusses pending cases and, in particular, adopts decisions upon 
the proposals contained in the preliminary reports. Due to its inherent judicial component, the 
general meeting is not open to the public, and the agenda and output thereof are never published. 
In this context, one may wonder to what extent the current organizational structure of the CJ in 
relation to the exercise of its administrative tasks – with the exception of the recently adopted 
rules governing the appointment of the Registrar – allows it to respond to the openness 
requirement as enshrined in Article 15 TFEU.  
 
                                                          
73 See e.g. Arts. 12, 52 of the Statute. 
74 It must be observed that these acts, being decisions, are placed below their respective rules of procedure and may, 
as a result, be more easily modified. 
75 The latter are expected to be withdrawn by the CJ as they no longer find a legal basis in the CJ Rules of 
Procedure. 
76 The O.J. publishes information with regard to the outcome of the various administrative processes involved, and 
issues such as the hearing dates are usually available on the webpage of the Court.  
77 The only indication in this regard is provided for in Art. 16 of the Protocol on the Statute of the CJEU; Art. 11 of 
the Rules of Procedure of the CJ; Art. 9 of the Rules of Procedure of the GC; Art. 10 of the Rules of Procedure of 
the CST. 
78 Art. 25 of the Rules of Procedure of the CJ. 
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3.2 Access to documents 
 
In line with Article 15(3) TFEU, the Court recently adopted a decision concerning access to its 
administrative documents. The scope of the decision reflects the limitation provided for in the 
Treaty, as it covers only the documents prepared in the exercise of the administrative functions 
of the EU’s judicial body. The decision does not discuss the precise parameters defining these 
“administrative functions”, leaving this clarification potentially to case law or further 
clarifications by the Court administration.  
 The approach adopted by the CJEU in ensuring access to its documents substantially 
mirrors that taken by Regulation 1049 in relation to the documents of the other EU institutions. 
Thus, the beneficiaries of the right of access are not only EU citizens, but also any natural or 
legal person as long as he or she has a residence or registered office in a Member State. Upon 
Court discretion, the latter may be granted a right of access even if he or she does not reside or 
have an office in a Member State. The exceptions allowing the EU Courts to reject a request are 
the same as in Regulation 1049, and they include public interest, the privacy and integrity of the 
individual, commercial interests, court proceedings and legal advice, and the purpose of 
inspections, investigations, and audits.79 
 With regard to the submission of requests, a form is available online for applicants to 
complete. As provided for in Article 4(5) of the decision, the applicants are not obliged to state 
their reasons for the application. The procedure for handling requests and eventually 
confirmatory applications in cases of denied access to documents is similar to that laid down in 
Regulation 1049. The Court has to acknowledge receipt, process the case swiftly, and inform the 
applicant of its right to challenge the final decision. The deadlines exceed those in Regulation 
1049, allowing in general one month to consider applications (as opposed to the 15-day deadline 
that applies to the Council, Commission, and Parliament). Similar to what it is provided by 
Regulation 1049, the refusal of confirmatory applications entitles the applicant to institute 
judicial proceedings challenging such decision and/or making a complaint to the European 
Ombudsman.80 This provision might arguably give rise to difficult situations, with the Court 
acting as judge and defendant in the same case.81 
 However, the possibility to institute court proceedings against refusals to grant access 
should be interpreted more as streamlining the functional distinction existing between the CJEU 
as administrator and the same Court as a judicial body. Indeed, given that the decision at stake 
applies only to documents issued in the exercise of administrative functions, the authorities 
empowered to grant access are administrative authorities, such as the Director General whose 
service holds the document requested, the Head of Service, and the Deputy Registrars.82 
Therefore, technically, the judges deciding such cases will have to assess the behaviour of 
administrative structures, and not their own actions. This development is set to strengthen, and 
perhaps eventually institute, a functional separation between the Court-administration and the 
Court-jurisdiction. Yet one may wonder whether the development of such a functional separation 
may run against the competing and equally valuable objective of ensuring a smooth relationship 
between the Court-jurisdiction and those administrative services its judges depend upon while 
discharging their judicial tasks. 
                                                          
79 Art. 3 of the Decision, cited supra note 12. 
80 Art. 7 of the Decision, ibid.. 
81 This however already occurs in staff cases. 
82 Art. 8 of the Decision, ibid. 
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 The means of access include the supply of the documents by the Court (charging a fee for 
producing and sending copies is possible),83 indication of the source of publication,84 and 
consultation on the spot.85 Unlike Regulation 1049/2001, the decision does not provide for the 
setting up of direct access in electronic form or through a register, and neither does it stipulate 
the obligation to draw up annual reports of the cases where access was refused. 
 While the publication of this decision is a welcome regulatory development capable of 
bringing the Court a step closer towards compliance with its transparency requirements as 
enshrined in Article 15(3) TFEU, it remains to be seen how the decision will be implemented in 
practice by the administrative apparatus of the Court. Critically, the decision fails to shed light 
on the very distinction between administrative and judicial tasks of the Court. As it will be 
illustrated in the next subsection, the line separating the two types of activities of the EU’s 
judicial body is difficult to draw and blurs the normative content of the openness requirement 
applicable to this institution. 
 
3.3 The blurred line separating judicial tasks from tasks with an administrative nature 
 
In the absence of case law and legislation on this matter, how to distinguish between the Courts’ 
administrative and judicial tasks remains an open, yet fundamental, question today. At the 
national level an ongoing debate exists as to what part of a court’s activity is judicial and what 
part is not.86 The debate revolves around whether judicial acts should be defined in a formal or a 
substantive way. From a formal point of view, any act issued by a Court might be considered 
judicial, whereas from a substantive point of view, this category includes only acts issued in 
order to ensure the respect of a certain legal order. While both these perspectives appear too 
vague and too large, it is considered that judicial tasks are those accomplished by a judge when 
solving disputes.87 Thus, one way to settle the distinction between judicial and administrative is 
to consider activities performed by the Court in fulfilment of its main task to exercise judgment, 
such as hearing a case, deliberating, and issuing a judgment, as judicial activities that escape the 
transparency requirement of Article 15 TFEU. Nonetheless, the way in which administrative 
activities are carried out might affect the way in which the court exercises its judgment. For 
example, one may wonder whether part of the activity fulfilled by the Registry of the Court is 
judicial or administrative. Indeed, the Registry plays an important role in collecting briefings of 
cases, communicating with the parties and potential interveners. It creates thus an interface 
between parties, interveners and the Court, in the early stages of judicial proceedings.  
 Moreover, the way in which judgments are conveyed to the public, albeit administrative 
in nature, relates directly to the act of judgment. For example, the tasks of translating and 
publishing judgments of the Court are administrative tasks, in the charge of the Registrar and the 
Directorate General for Translation. However, both publication and translation relate directly to 
the content of texts that were issued by the Court in fulfilment of its task to carry out judgment, 
and hence are intrinsically linked to judicial tasks. Finally, even communicating the activity of 
the Court to the outside world through press releases, visits, or exchanges with foreign courts, 
                                                          
83 Art. 11 of the Decision, ibid. 
84 Art. 10(2) of the Decision, ibid. 
85 Art. 10 of the Decision, ibid. 
86 See e.g. on French law Bandrac, “De l’acte juridictionnel et de ceux des actes du juge qui ne le sont pas”, in Le 
Juge entre Deux Millénaires. Mélanges Offerts à Pierre Drai (Dalloz, 2000), p. 171-183; on American law see 
Schwartz, “The other things that courts do”, 28 UCLA L. Rev. (1980-1981), 438 et seq. 
87 Terré, Introduction Générale au Droit (Dalloz, 2009), p. 598. 
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while administrative in nature at first glance, relate to communicating the way in which judicial 
tasks are fulfilled.  
 The situations described above concern functions carried out by bodies that are part of the 
administrative structure of the Court, such as the Registry and the Directorate General for 
Translation, the Press and Information Service and the Protocol and Visits Directorate. Other 
tasks are exercised directly by Court members, such as assigning the case to a certain Judge 
Rapporteur, a prerogative of the President of each jurisdiction. 88 While this task is more closely 
related to the judicial functions than those previously described, it does not have the same nature 
as other judicial functions such as hearing or deliberating a case. It also has a different nature 
from the task of assigning cases to formations of the Court,89 done upon a proposal of the Judge 
Rapporteur, who undertakes a preliminary assessment of the case in order to determine inter alia 
whether it is “difficult or important enough” to be assigned to the Grand Chamber.90 The 
decision on assigning cases to a certain formation is taken during the weekly general meeting, 
whose proceedings – as previously discussed – are not (and cannot be) open to the public.91 
What should one make of an authorization request introduced to the weekly general meeting by a 
Member of the Court to engage in an external activity (e.g. teaching, public speaking, editorial 
meeting, etc)? Although this document does not seem prima facie to relate to the judicial activity 
of the Court, the rationale for this authorization procedure can be found in the need to protect the 
independence of the institution. The President and the members of the Court gathered in the 
weekly general meeting are expected to assess whether that particular activity involving an 
individual member may threaten the independence of the Court. 
 This brief examination demonstrates that determining which activities belong to the 
judicial and which belong to the administrative task is a difficult enterprise. Despite these 
difficulties, it possible to advance a criterion that could enable the interpreter to distinguish the 
Court’s output stemming from the exercise of its judicial function from that related to its 
administrative tasks. In our view, only those activities and documents that belong to the process, 
being a direct expression of a court’s judicial activity, should escape the principle of access to 
documents. Thus, on this basis, while the reading and publication of a judgment are part of the 
process, its press release, which may in turn be circulated through a tweet, is not and therefore 
does not deserve protection. 
 In any event, when called to settle this issue, the analysis and the conclusions drawn by 
the EU Courts will most certainly reflect the judgement of their members as to the level of 
openness and transparency to which their judicial activity is subject. Our survey among several 
judges of the CJ gathered a very diverse set of opinions on this point. Given the exceptio est 
strictissimae interpretationis principle, the question that the Court will be called upon to answer 
concerns the object of the exception introduced by Article 15(3)(4). First and foremost, the 
language employed refers only to access to documents, and does not exempt the Court from 
conducting its “work as openly as possible” – as provided for in the first paragraph of the same 
Article. Thus, similar to all other EU institutions, the EU Courts have to make sure to exercise all 
their activities in a transparent fashion, and also to establish an active policy of reaching out and 
                                                          
88 Similarly, one may refer to the task of assigning a case deserving the preparation of an Opinion to an Advocate 
General, a prerogative of the First Advocate General. See Art. 16 of the Rules of Procedure of the CJ. 
89 Art. 60 of the Rules of Procedure of the CJ. 
90 Art. 59 of the Rules of Procedure of the CJ. 
91 It is of interest to observe that minutes are drawn up during this meeting by the Registrar or, in his absence, by the 
most junior judge. See Art. 26 of the CJ Rules of Procedure.  
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informing individuals of their work. Second, since the essence of the Courts’ activities consists 
in handling proceedings and their related documents, the non-administrative category, although 
residual, is clearly more significant in size and consists in activities that may be qualified as 
judicial as they relate to Court proceedings.  
 With this in mind, the next section turns to assessing the openness of the bulk of the 
activity of the EU Courts: their tasks to hear and instruct cases as well as to render judgments.  
 
 
4. Assessing the openness of the judicial activity of the Court 
 
The views expressed in the literature with regard to the nature and degree of openness of the 
judicial activity of the EU Courts are mixed. On the one hand, any form of “openness talk” at the 
CJEU appears taboo, because it arguably interferes with carrying out the act of justice and is 
immediately perceived as a potential threat to the principle of secrecy of deliberations.92 On the 
other hand, some view more favourably this type of discussion, on the ground that the debates of 
improving openness should relate not only to the Commission and the Council but also to the 
European judicial institution.93 Rasmussen warned that embracing such a policy of openness is 
paradoxical since the activities of the Court are inherently non-transparent. In this vein, he drew 
the reader’s attention to the procedure of appointing judges traditionally carried out behind 
closed doors, to the lack of dissenting opinions, and to the potentially difficult cooperation with 
national courts (due to increasing backlogs of cases).94 These concerns have partly been 
addressed recently by amending the judges’ appointment procedure,95 as well as by reducing the 
time of processing preliminary references. Lasser gives a more nuanced account regarding the 
degree of openness of the European Courts’ activities, while focusing on a different angle: 
judicial reasoning.96 He argues that, even in the absence of dissenting opinions, the judgments of 
the Court can engage with the arguments presented by the Advocates General in their Opinions. 
This practice fosters dialogue, insofar as those opinions are published and accessible to the 
citizens.97 Along similar lines, it has been argued that Opinions of Advocates General provide a 
valuable bridge between the judicial deliberations of the Court and the outside, thus contributing 
                                                          
92 See Art. 2 of the Statute, Arts. 4 and 32 of the CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 4 of the GC Rules of Procedure, and 
Art. 3 of the CST Rules of Procedure. 
93 Rasmussen, op. cit. supra note 23, 1661 et seq. 
94 Ibid., 1678-1683. 
95 On this reform and the establishment of the expert panel provided for by Art. 255 TFEU, see Mance, “The 
Composition of the European Court of Justice”, text of a talk given to the UK Association for European Law, 19 
Oct. 2011; Vesterdorf, “La nomination des juges de la Cour de Justice”, 47 CDE (2012), 610 et seq; Sauvé, “Le rôle 
du comité 255 dans le sélection du juge de l’Union”, in Rosas, Levits and Bot (Eds.), The Court of Justice and the 
Construction of Europe: Analyses and Perspectives on Sixty Years of Case-law – La Cour de Justice et la 
Construction de l’Europe: Analyses et Perspectives de Soixante Ans de Jurisprudence (Asser Press/Springer, 2013), 
at pp. 102-103. On the transparency of the appointment of the EU Courts’ members following the establishment of 
Art. 255 TFEU’s panel, see Alemanno, “Access to information versus privacy in the process of selection: Is there 
reasonable middle ground?”, in Bobek (Ed.), Selecting Europe’s Judges – A Critical Appraisal of Appointment 
Processes to the European Courts (OUP, forthcoming, 2014). 
96 On judicial reasoning as part of judicial legitimation, see von Bogdandy and Venzke, op. cit. supra note 53 , p. 15 
et seq. 
97 On “discursive legitimacy”, see Lasser, Judicial Deliberations: A Comparative Analysis of Judicial Transparency 
and Legitimacy (OUP, 2004). 
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not only to institutional legitimacy of the Court but also to the substantive and authoritative 
legitimacy of a particular decision in the eyes of the public.98 
 In line with the research question expressed at the outset, this article focuses on the 
institutional side of openness, leaving to further research the impact that openness might have on 
judicial reasoning. Indeed, we start from the premise that in order to be able to ascertain whether 
the legal reasoning of the Court is clear or cryptic, one needs first and foremost to have access to 
the material that would enable such assessment. In this connection, a growing public sensitivity 
to judicial openness can be observed at the EU level. Recently, several legal practitioners 
complained to the Committee on Legal Affairs of the European Parliament that “it is often 
impossible to follow the process by which EU case law is made because documents of the Court 
of Justice of the European Union are not accessible.”99 
 These concerns prompted a study from the Citizen’s Rights and Constitutional Affairs 
Department of the European Parliament (hereinafter the “EP study”) on the national practices 
with regard to the accessibility of court documents. The study aims at addressing “the right of 
access to court documents relating to the judicial functioning of the judiciary”.100 The EP study is 
timely, and includes some interesting suggestions. It rightfully points out that the Court might 
learn from the practices endorsed by other judicial institutions with regard to openness. 
However, the study does not undertake a comparative analysis of judicial institutions, as this 
appears a monumental task.101 Other studies reveal a vast array of experiences at the national 
level in the EU, varying from systems that exempt courts from transparency obligations (such as 
for instance Spain, Germany and the Slovak Republic) to more open systems (such as UK and 
Poland among others).102 In the absence of a common denominator, it was argued that the EU 
Court can become a transparency “pioneer”,103 and that the EU should not follow those national 
judicial traditions of “aloofness and remoteness from the world outside courtrooms”,104 
especially given the current mission to ensure open government throughout Europe.  
 Access to court files appears central to the suggestions formulated in the EP study. Thus, 
all documents pertaining to court proceedings are treated together by the study; little attention is 
paid to matters such as the physical access to Court hearings and publication of judgments, while 
the massive problems raised by linguistic diversity are overlooked. We suggest a broader and 
more structured analytical framework, constructed according to the main phases of the procedure 
taking place in front of the EU Courts.105 Hence, one can distinguish between input openness, 
related to the written stage of the procedure; throughput openness, related to the oral phase and 
                                                          
98 Hinarejos, “Social legitimacy and the Court of Justice of the EU. Some reflections on the role of the Advocate 
General”, 15 CYELS (2012), 615-634. 
99 See Study of the European Parliament, National practices with regard to the accessibility of court documents, 
April 2013, PE 474.406, p.7.  
100 Ibid., 18. 
101 Ibid., 10. 
102 Musar, “Access to court records and FOIA as legal basis – experience of Slovenia”, available online at <www.ip-
rs.si/fileadmin/user_upload/Pdf/konference/Nova_Zelandija__predavanje1.pdf> (last visited 15 Nov. 2013.) See 
also the Opinion of A.G. Maduro in API, cited supra note 27.  
103 Study of the EP on the accessibility of court documents, cited supra note 99, p. 8. 
104 Rasmussen, op. cit. supra note 23, 1661 et seq, at 1667. 
105 This parallels the methodology used by Brandsma, Curtin and Meijer in their evaluation of transparency of the 
comitology processes, see Brandsma, Curtin and Meijer, op. cit. supra note 42, at 826. 
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the Courts’ deliberations;106 and output openness, related to the delivery of judgment and 
subsequent diffusion. Given that the legal procedure in front of the EU Courts is the backbone of 
the EU judicial body’s functioning, the conclusions drawn in this regard will allow us to gain an 
overview of the overall level of openness of the CJEU as both an administration and a 
jurisdiction. 
 
 
4.1 Input openness 
 
Input openness refers to the initial phase of the procedure before the EU Courts and essentially 
coincides with the written part, a phase during which a significant quantity of information and 
documents are generated both by the parties to a dispute and by the courts themselves. The 
assessment covers the period from the moment of the registration of the application until the 
opening of the oral procedure. We argue that EU Courts should make available clearer 
information concerning the existence of a case and that, in principle, access to the parties’ 
submissions should be granted to third party applicants. 
 
4.1.1 Access to information related to the existence of a case 
Following registration, a notice is published in the Official Journal containing the date of 
registration of an application initiating proceedings, the names of the parties, the subject-matter 
of the proceedings, the form of order sought by the applicant, and a summary of the pleas in law 
and of the main supporting arguments. In case of a preliminary ruling, it also contains the 
identity of the referring court and of the parties in the main proceedings, as well as the questions 
asked.107 It is commendable that the final version of the new rules of procedure of the Court 
discarded the initial proposal according to which the summary of the pleas in law and the 
supporting arguments would be published on the O.J. only “where appropriate.”108 Indeed, as is 
illustrated below, this publication represents the only information made available to the general 
public about pending cases.109 
                                                          
106 According to Art. 20(1) of the CJEU Statute, the procedure consists of a written part and an oral part. See also 
Art. 53 of the CJ Rules of Procedure, Chs. 1 and 2 of Title 2 of the CST Rules of Procedure and of the GC Rules of 
Procedure. 
107 Art. 21 (4) of CJ Rules of Procedure and Art. 24 (6) of the GC Rules of Procedure. 
108 Art. 21 (4) of the Draft CJ Rules of Procedure, 25 May 2011. 
109 On the contrary, the EFTA Court publishes the case details on its website. See <www.eftacourt.int/cases/> (last 
visited 15 Nov. 2013). 
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 One of the most obvious limitations to input transparency occurs in references for 
preliminary rulings. The original requests from national courts are not – and never were – 
published in all the official languages of the EU. Although the original version of the preliminary 
reference is communicated by the Court to all Member States accompanied by a translation into 
the official language of the State to which it is addressed, these documents are never disclosed to 
the public.110 What is more, on account of the length of the national court’s decision, only a 
translated summary of the decision must be communicated to the States.111 This has become the 
practice of the Court, under the old Article 104(1) of the Rules of Procedure, when in 2005 – in 
the aftermath of the 2004 accession – the EU moved from 11 to 20 official languages.112 A 
summary may be established as soon as a request for a preliminary ruling is longer than 20 
pages.113 In 2012, out of 403 preliminary references, 67 summaries were established.114  
 These practices concerning preliminary rulings are motivated by the need to respect the 
Member States’ autonomy in determining how their jurisdictions may co-operate with the CJEU. 
In turn these practices reflect different degrees of judicial transparency. At the same time, they 
appear necessary in order to enable the Court to dispose of the case within a reasonable period of 
time. Nonetheless, these practices may be problematic for several reasons. A good flow of 
information between the CJEU and the national courts would necessitate much more than 
serving on the Member States the original request for preliminary ruling or the summary thereof. 
Indeed, as noted in the literature, national courts could benefit from having access to the original 
order requesting the preliminary ruling as well as to the final decision of the national courts 
following the CJEU judgment.115 Furthermore, preventing disclosure of the original request 
precludes the observer from understanding why the Court has declared a request inadmissible. 
More fundamentally, the lack of access to the original request prevents understanding the gap 
between the judicial context characterizing the national court’s decision to refer and the final 
judgment of the Court. 
 These transparency deficiencies are to a certain extent palliated by other bodies than the 
CJEU.116 Thus, some courts of the Member States publish a compilation of preliminary 
references from various Member States translated into their own language,117 while judicial 
networks created data bases sharing this type of case law.118 There are even companies 
compiling such data bases and providing access thereto for professionals, in exchange for fees.119 
                                                          
110 Contrary to what one might expect, this communication does not occur immediately after the lodging of the 
request, but on average after 4-6 weeks. Interview with CJ official, 14 Jan. 2013. 
111 Art. 98 of the CJ Rules of Procedure. 
112 This provision was part of the institutional arrangements related to the enlargement and has now become Art. 98 
of the CJ Rules of Procedure.  
113 Originally, the threshold triggering the preparation of the summary was 25 pages. One page according to the 
Court contains a maximum of 1500 characters. 
114 Interview with CJ official, 14 Jan. 2013. 
115 Bobek, op. cit. supra note 54. 
116 Ibid. 
117 This is the case in inter alia the Netherlands, the Czech Republic, Poland, Romania and Portugal. While the 
Portuguese Supremo Tribunal de Justiça has been doing this since 2010, its website only lists the questions referred, 
and it does not offer translations of the whole preliminary reference. See <www.stj.pt/jurisprudencia/tjue> (last 
visited 15 Nov. 2013). Anecdotal evidence mentioned by the EP study (p. 54) shows that lawyers navigate foreign 
courts websites in order to obtain information on preliminary rulings by using various translation applications 
(which may be more or less accurate). 
118 JuriFast (<www.juradmin.eu/fr/jurisprudence/jurifast_fr.html> (last visited 15 Nov. 2013), a data base set by the 
Association of Councils of State and the Supreme Administrative Jurisdictions. 
119 E.g. CASELEX, <www.caselex.com/> (last visited 15 Nov. 2013).  
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Finally, the CJEU established, through its Research and Documentation Service, Dec.nat, a 
collection of the case law of the courts and tribunals of the Member States concerning European 
Union law.120 This initiative is praiseworthy as it facilitates the dissemination of information 
about EU law enforcement. Besides the necessity to update the database more frequently,121 a 
welcome development would be ensuring a user-friendly interface that would link preliminary 
ruling judgments issued by the Court to the relevant national decisions in particular cases.122  
 
4.1.2 Access to Court submissions 
Procedural documents and supporting items filed in the EU Courts by the parties are not 
published, but only entered in the order of submission in a register.123 Under the Rules of 
Procedure of EU Courts, third parties are free to consult this register and may obtain copies or 
extracts for a fee. However, the same rules establish different triggers enabling third parties to 
gain access to register entries. At the CJ, “anyone” may consult the register;124 at the GC, 
“having an interest” in consulting the entries may suffice;125 while “a duly substantiated interest” 
is needed for persons desiring to have access to the register of the CST.126 To a certain extent, 
this differentiation could be justified at the level of the CST, given the inherent nature of the 
cases dealt with by this specialized court, pertaining to private matters related to EU officials’ 
careers. It might equally be argued that cases before the General Court require greater direct 
implication for the parties than before the Court of Justice, which settles mostly points of legal 
interpretation. However, we find the restrictions at the CST and the GC level disproportionate, as 
protecting private interests in cases might be done in a less restrictive manner by the Courts 
themselves, when classifying certain information.  
 Following registration, procedural documents are kept in the case file, together with 
decisions taken in the case, minutes and reports of hearings, notices and other documents of 
correspondence.127 Only the parties to the proceedings and the interveners enjoy access to the 
case file128 since they are served with the pleadings and other documents related to the case by 
the Registries.129 The situation is different with regard to the general public, since third parties do 
not enjoy under the current legislative framework a right of access to the case file, and in 
particular to the procedural documents that the parties filed with the registries, even when the 
case is closed. Indeed, Article 20 of the Statute provides that the documents belonging to the case 
                                                          
120 See the Dec.nat database, containing over 26,000 national decisions at 
<www.juradmin.eu/en/jurisprudence/jurisprudence_en.lasso> (last visited 15 Nov. 2013). 
121 The most recent update is from December 2012. (information valid on 15 Nov. 2013). 
122 As pointed out by the EP study, creating a database of summaries of preliminary ruling cases might be a good 
solution. However, the suggestion to have the database only in French clashes with the principle of multilingualism. 
(EP study, cited supra note 99, at p. 58.) 
123Art. 21(1) of the CJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 24(1) of the GC Rules of Procedure, and Art. 20(1) of the CST Rules 
of Procedure. 
124 Art. 22(1) of the CJ Rules of Procedure. 
125 Art. 24(5) of the GC Rules of Procedure. 
126 Art. 24(5) of the CST Rules of Procedure. 
127 Art. 2 of the Instructions to the CJ Registrar, Art. 5(1) of the Instructions to the GC Registrar; Art. 6(1) of the 
Instructions to the CST Registrar. 
128 The Instructions to the Registrar of the General Court (in Arts. 5 and 6) detail more than those of the CJ the way 
in which Court files can be accessed. 
129 See Art. 20 of the Statute as well as Art. 48 of the CJ Rules of Procedure and Art. 3(3) of the Instructions to the 
Registrar of the Court of Justice; Art. 100 of the GC Rules of Procedure and Art. 10 of the Instructions to the 
Registrar of the General Court; Art. 99 of the CST Rules of Procedure and Art. 10 of the Instructions to the Registrar 
of the CST. 
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file are communicated to the parties and to the institutions of the Union whose decisions are in 
dispute, and makes no mention of third party communications. In line with Article 15(3) TFEU, 
the documents belonging to the case file – having a non-administrative nature – are legally 
exempt from the duty of disclosure, and neither do they form the object of the recent decision of 
the Court on access to documents held in the exercise of administrative tasks. No third-party 
right of access to the case file is expressly recognized by the rules concerning the CJ, although 
this issue is currently under discussion.130 At the GC level, third parties can have access to the 
case file on express authorization by the President or, if the case is still pending, by the President 
of the formation of the Court, but only after the parties have been heard.131 At the CST, such 
authorization is a prerogative of the President.132 In both situations, the third party asking for 
access to a case file must justify a legitimate interest in inspecting the file.133 In conclusion, a 
combined reading of Article 15(3) TFEU, Article 20 of the Statute and the Instructions to the 
Registrar suggests that, as a rule, the case file is not accessible to third parties. 
 Third parties may ask directly the parties of the proceeding to have access to the 
documents relevant to the dispute.134 Indeed, in the absence of express legislative indication, 
parties to a proceeding are in principle free to disclose their written submissions.135 This could be 
translated into an obligation for the EU institutions to disclose their written submissions in cases 
before the Court, given the principle of free access to EU documents provided for in Regulation 
1049/2001. However, the same regulation recognizes that the refusal to grant access to 
institutional pleadings is justified if such access would undermine the protection of court 
proceedings, unless there is an overriding public interest in the disclosure.136 
 This exception was discussed in API, where third party access to documents in closed and 
pending cases was at issue. The CJ held that the disclosure of institutional pleadings in pending 
cases should be presumed as undermining the protection of judicial proceedings.137 As a result of 
this judgment, EU institutions are under no obligation to examine on a case-by-case basis each 
request before denying access to their pleadings in cases that are not yet decided, even if the 
hearings have already taken place. Conversely, this presumption ceases to exist once a judgment 
has been issued in a case. While these documents are still protected under Article 4(2) of 
Regulation 1049,138 the institutions concerned are required to undertake a case-by-case analysis 
for each disclosure request. 
 API illustrates the difficulties faced by third parties when trying to access documents 
pertaining to the written phase of Court proceedings, difficulties that appear paramount in 
pending cases. Disclosure would arguably render meaningless the possibility to hold proceedings 
in camera139 and jeopardize the principle of equality of arms, exposing the arguments of the 
                                                          
130 Communication with Court of Justice Registry official, 12/06/2013. 
131 Art. 5(8) Instructions to the Registrar of GC. 
132 Art. 20 of the CST Rules of Procedure. 
133 Art. 5(8) Instructions to the Registrar of GC and Art. 20 of the CST Rules of Procedure. 
134 Judgment in Case T-36/04, API v. Commission, [2007] ECR II-3201, paras. 86-89. 
135 Order in Case C-376/98, Germany v. Parliament and Council, [2000] ECR I-2247, para 10. 
136 Art. 4(2) of the Regulation. 
137 API, cited supra note 27, para 94. 
138 In line with Art. 15(3) TFEU, the Commission proposal revising Regulation 1049 maintained the Art. 4(2) 
exception with regard to documents that do not fall within the exercise of the Court’s administrative tasks. See 
Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council regarding public access to European 
Parliament, Council and Commission document, COM(2008)0229 final. 
139 Art. 31 of the Statute; Art. 79 of the CJ Rules of Procedure; Art. 57 of the GC Rules of Procedure. 
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institutions to public debate unlike those of their opponents.140 Finally, it might place EU Courts 
under “external pressure, albeit only in the perception of the public, and would disrupt the 
serenity of the proceedings.”141 Yet such justifications fade away if one takes into consideration 
other international and domestic experiences. Thus, under Article 40(2) ECHR, the Strasbourg 
court allows in principle public access to files in both pending and closed cases142 and imposes a 
similar standard on its member’s judiciaries.143 Several international and domestic courts, such as 
the US federal judiciary, share this practice, and some authors argue that such access might 
increase legal certainty.144  
 The above experiences suggest that granting access to submissions does not 
automatically threaten the serenity of judicial proceedings. Critically, it is rather up to the actual 
discretion enjoyed by parties to a dispute to disclose their written pleadings that appears capable 
of encroaching on the protection of judicial proceedings. In response to such a concern, 
Advocate General Maduro rightfully pointed out in API that the Court should be the master of its 
own case, since it is the only one in a position to determine whether releasing documents could 
have a negative impact on the proceedings.145 This solution would be beneficial not only for the 
parties, but also for the European institutions, which would be alleviated of the task of analysing 
disclosure requests concerning documents related to court proceedings. Yet, the Court in API did 
not endorse this approach.146 
 Critically, such a solution does not stand at odds with the national regimes of access to 
court files. Indeed, Advocate General Maduro could not distil from the common legal traditions 
of the EU Member States a principle requiring public access to the file in pending cases, while in 
the majority of the Member States the courts had the discretion to grant such access. Easier 
access to case files at the level of the EU Courts might entice quicker changes at the national 
level too. Indeed, the common traditions of the Member States do not actually require 
confidentiality of the case file, and Sweden and Finland already recognize a right of access to 
documents in pending cases.147 Nonetheless, given the diverse traditions at the national level,148 
we believe that no abrupt change should occur solely by judicial intervention with regard to the 
policy of granting access to files in pending cases. Therefore, a principle of full access to files in 
pending cases should develop incrementally, mirroring an eventual evolution of the national 
legal systems towards more openness of judicial activity. 
 With regard to closed cases, access to the file appears easier. However, it is still 
dependent on either the existence of a “legitimate interest” when requiring access to the case file 
directly from the EU Courts, or on the will of the parties to a case – albeit within the API limits 
in cases involving the European institutions. Nevertheless, even if public access to the case file 
                                                          
140 API, cited supra note 27, paras. 85 et seq. 
141 Ibid., para 93. 
142 The requests can be submitted online through the webpage 
<appform.echr.coe.int/echrrequest/request.aspx?lang=en&occupation=T5_4&request=T5_2> (last visited 15 Nov. 
2013). 
143 See e.g. Társaság a Szabadságjogokért v. Hungary, judgment of 14 Apr. 2009, App. No. 37374/05, where the 
ECtHR held that failure to grant access to submissions in a case before the Hungarian Constitutional Court 
amounted to a violation of Art. 10 ECHR. 
144 Anderson, op. cit. supra note 22, 811 et seq. 
145 Opinion of A.G. Maduro in API, cited supra note 27, para 14. 
146 API, cited supra note 27, para 156. 
147 Opinion of A.G. Maduro in API, cited supra note 27, para 14. 
148 For an overview, see Study of the European Parliament, National practices with regard to the accessibility of 
court documents, April 2013, PE 474.406. 
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in closed cases should be recognized, this will not automatically guarantee actual access to these 
documents, since they are drawn up in the language of the case149 and generally not translated 
into other EU official languages. This is because the documents belonging to a case file are 
required to be translated only into the language of procedure; sometimes, by reason of the length 
of the document, only extracts are translated. Although the new CJ Rules of Procedure enable the 
Court to establish a maximum length of the written pleadings,150 given the important volume of 
translations already in existence at the level of the Court, making all files available in all 24 
official languages would be an almost impossible task that would increase tremendously both the 
costs and duration of proceedings.  
 In this regard, input transparency could be improved by following the line suggested by 
Advocate General Maduro in API: the Court should be the one to decide whether or not to grant 
free access to the case file. Two possibilities can be envisaged in this case. First, the Court could 
deal with requests for access on a case-by-case basis. In this regard, the Court could issue 
another decision setting a procedures for access to judicial documents, as it did with the 
administrative ones. Second, free access to the case file could be the rule, with the possibility for 
the Court to classify certain files if secrecy needs to be observed (e.g. for the cases held in 
camera).151 In these circumstances, individuals could be allowed free access to a “public” part of 
the Court records (containing unclassified case files). In our view, this second solution is to be 
preferred from a transparency perspective. Indeed, it could be beneficial not only for the lawyer 
in search of arguments that would help their clients in future or pending cases and the national 
judge facing a similar case, but it would allow large scale studies to be conducted by academics 
and would create the premises to better understand European case law and reflect on the work of 
the CJEU as an institution of European integration.152 An argument has also been made that more 
accessibility to Court documents, by enabling the public to scrutinize the quality of the 
submissions, could render the market for legal services more transparent.153 This will of course 
create additional financial and administrative burdens, as many of these documents would need 
to be translated in the official languages of the Union. Ensuring a fair balance between the need 
for transparency and the costs of transparency might indeed entail limitations, such as for 
instance making documents available only in certain linguistic versions.154 From a logistical 
point of view, the EP study makes the suggestion that access could be ensured through the e-
Curia application, which already allows the exchange of documents between the parties and the 
Court.155 
 
4.1.3. Evaluation 
From the point of view of distribution of information, at the input level of the judicial process, 
the Court of Justice scores well concerning information about the existence of a case, with the 
                                                          
149 Art. 38(1), CJ Rules of Procedure; Art. 35(3), GC Rules of Procedure. 
150 Art. 58 CJ Rules of Procedure. Similar the Instructions to the Parties by the GC provides for maximum length for 
the parties’ submissions. 
151 A combination of both approaches could also be envisaged. 
152 Vauchez, “The transnational politics of jurisprudence. Van Gend en Loos and the making of EU polity”, 16 ELJ 
(2010), 1-28. 
153 See, Lamadrid, “Sunshine Lawyering”, post published on 2 May 2013 on Chillin’Competition, available at 
<chillingcompetition.com/2013/05/02/sunshine-lawyering/> (last visited 15 Nov. 2013). 
154 Hopefully not limited to French (the internal working language of the Court); we argue that, due to current 
linguistic realities, translating the documents into English should be a must. 
155 The EP study, supra note 99, at p. 56. 
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notable caveat regarding information concerning the national proceedings in preliminary 
references. From the point of view of access to information, the Court fares quite well with 
regard to access to information entered in the register, yet it restricts the access to actual 
documents and pleadings submitted during the proceedings. 
 The challenges to input openness relate to both institutional capacity and legal ethos. 
Indeed, as seen above, ensuring translations in all languages of information regarding the 
existence of a case and of the detailed arguments of the parties is difficult. While the translation 
problem could potentially be solved allowing access to procedural documents in their original 
version, and leaving translations costs in the charge of those interested, this may lead the EU 
courts to depart from the respect from the principle of multilinguism.156 In this context, we see 
that the specificities of the judicial mission entrusted to the CJEU involve important choices 
between core principles of law, such as the requirement to carry out justice in a prompt manner 
and the need for judicial openness.157 Furthermore, as regards the access to pleadings in pending 
cases, we observe that the diverse legal traditions in Europe make it virtually impossible for the 
Court to ensure full open access to its procedural documents. Due to the Article 15 TFEU 
exception, complete transparency in this regard is not even envisaged under the current legal 
framework. In these circumstances, one step towards ensuring more openness in this regard is to 
allow public access to the Court records. 
 
4.2 Throughput openness 
 
Throughput openness relates to the oral phase of the proceeding. Although not of the same 
magnitude as in the input phase, a significant amount of information is generated by both the 
parties to the proceeding and the Courts also in this intermediate phase. 
 
4.2.1 Access to the hearings 
Publicity of oral hearings is guaranteed through the website of the Court. As expressly stated by 
the Statute and in accordance with Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights (CFR), 
access to the oral hearing is in principle public.158 To make public access to hearings a reality, 
the website of the Court regularly publishes the judicial calendar, thus making available the dates 
of forthcoming hearings. Publicity of oral hearings and public access to the courtroom seem to 
ensure an adequate level of throughput openness prima facie. Of course, some restrictions are 
justifiable in those cases heard in camera.159 
 However, attendance at a hearing and access to the information herewith exchanged 
presupposes physical presence, and therefore a trip to Luxembourg. This difficulty can be 
palliated in a number of ways. The current rules provide for the possibility to consult, under very 
limited circumstances, the minutes of the hearing or to listen to the soundtrack thereto. Minutes 
of the hearings are drawn by the Registrar and constitute the official record.160 The parties to the 
case and third parties can inspect the minutes at the registry and obtain copies – an activity that 
                                                          
156 As enshrined in Arts. 36 and 38(2) of the CJ Rules of Procedures, Arts. 35 and 36 of the GC Rules of Procedure. 
157 See Gaudissart, “Le regime et la pratique linguistiques de la Cour de Justice”, in Hanf, Malacek and Muir, 
Langues et construction européenne (PIE Peter Lang, 2007), pp. 150-151. 
158 Art. 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and restated in Art. 31 of the Statute. 
159 Art. 31 of the Statute; Art. 79 Rules of Procedure of the CJ, Art. 57 Rules of Procedure of the GC; Art. 51 Rules 
of Procedure of the CST. 
160 Art. 33 Statute, Art. 84 Rules of Procedure of the CJ, Art. 63 Rules of Procedure of the GC; Art. 53 Rules of 
Procedure of the CST. 
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again requires considerable logistical efforts on the part of those interested, if they are not based 
in Luxembourg. The new Rules of Procedure of the CJ provide for the first time the possibility to 
authorize a party or an interested person who has participated in the proceedings to listen to the 
recording of the hearing in the language used by the speaker during that hearing.161  
 This emerges as a clear improvement from the point of view of transparency. Yet the 
Court could go further than this, by inter alia broadcasting the hearing online and making 
available the minutes. Indeed, as pointed out in the literature, ensuring open court can occur 
naturally by allowing public access to the courtroom, but, most importantly, it requires 
sometimes the intervention of the public authority. It thus implies certain requirements that the 
architecture of the courthouse does not always accommodate. It requires sufficient space for the 
public to participate effectively and to allow the press to report trials, film and broadcast court 
sessions.162 Broadcasting sessions could be done at a very low cost since video equipment 
already exists in all courtrooms163 and minutes are already available. A disclaimer excluding all 
legal consequences stemming from the sudden unavailability of these forms of support should be 
enough to limit any possible claims. Such course of action would also be capable of solving an 
urgent logistical problem faced by the Court: it would allow landmark cases to be watched by 
many people at the same time, avoiding delicate situations such as that raised during the hearings 
in Microsoft164 and the People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran.165 In these cases, the sudden 
afflux of a record number of visitors to the Court in the morning of the hearings put the Court 
under great pressure.166 In the meantime, the Court’s reluctance to facilitate the attendance of the 
hearing is creating a market for specialized media outlets that can afford to pay a journalist to 
attend hearings and provide summaries online to their subscribers.167 
 Initiatives regarding the broadcasting of hearings were successfully undertaken by the 
ECtHR, which has made webcasts available online since 2007.168 The website of the EFTA court 
displays user-friendly links to the available recordings of various judgments and press 
statements.169 At the domestic level, practices with regard to the filming of court cases vary and 
tend not to face the burden of multilinguism. They are generally not easily accepted because they 
are argued to interfere with the act of justice,170 and might not be understood by the average 
citizen.171 However, given the high importance of the media nowadays, the reluctance to 
broadcast court trials cannot be justified any longer.172 In England, for example, the proceedings 
                                                          
161 Art. 85 Rules of Procedure of CJ. 
162 Mulcahy, Legal Architecture: Justice, Due Process and the Place of Law, Routledge (2011), pp. 87-106. 
163 Interview with Officials of the Press and Information Unit, Court of Justice of the European Union, 18 Jan. 2012.  
164 Case T-201/04, Microsoft v. Commission, [2007] ECR II-3601. 
165 Case T-284/08, People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran v. Council of the European Union, [2008] ECR II-
3487; Case C-27/09, French Republic v. People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran, judgment of 21 Dec. 2011, nyr.  
166 Interview with officials of the Press and Information Unit, CJEU, 18 Jan. 2012. 
167 See e.g. m-Lex, market intelligence. 
168 Under Irish Aid financing as confirmed by the logo attached to each webcast on the site 
<www.echr.coe.int/ECHR/EN/Header/Press/Multimedia/Webcasts+of+public+hearings/> (last visited 15 Nov. 
2013); see also Justice Hedigan, “The European Court of Human Rights: Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow”, 12 
German Law Journal (2011), 1716-1729, at 1727, available at 
<www.germanlawjournal.com/index.php?pageID=11&artID=1381> (last visited 15 Nov. 2013). 
169 <www.eftacourt.int/press-publications/news/2013/browse/1/> (last visited 15 Nov. 2013). 
170 Mulcahy, op. cit. supra note 162, p. 105. 
171 According to Justice Sonia Sotomayor of the US Supreme Court, interview by Charlie Rose, 6 Feb. 2013, 
available at <www.charlierose.com/view/interview/12765> (last visited 15 Nov. 2013). 
172 Mulcahy, op. cit. supra note 162, p. 105. 
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of the Supreme Court are broadcast live on the Internet page of Sky News,173 even though they 
are not available outside live transmissions. The same court has a YouTube page showing 
summaries of hearings and a Twitter account followed by over 35,000 persons.174 Furthermore, 
starting in October 2013 filming is allowed in the appeal courts of England and Wales, and 
judges receive training before appearing on camera.175 The Brazilian Supreme Federal Tribunal 
administers a YouTube page where complete recordings of hearings are available at all times,176 
while in the US the debate on televising the US Supreme Court proceedings is ongoing.177 Thus, 
in an era characterized by social media and a 24-hour news cycle, it is commendable that the 
Court of Justice of the European Union has recently opened a Twitter account, 178 and aims at 
sending “one to three Tweets per week … concerning decisions and certain institutional 
events.”179 
 
4.2.2 Access to the report for the hearing 
Throughput transparency has historically been ensured by the availability of the report for the 
hearing, an official document prepared by the Judge Rapporteur summing up the arguments of 
the parties to the dispute.180 In this regard, the CJEU used to fare higher from a judicial 
transparency point of view than national legal orders that in most cases do not prepare such 
reports and make them available. The report used to be circulated to the parties before the 
hearing and made accessible on the day of the hearing to all interested parties in attendance. 
Although the public could have access to this document in the language of the case and upon 
request,181 the policy of systematic publication of the report rendered throughput transparency 
more tangible. This document traditionally offered the parties to a dispute the possibility to 
verify whether the judges had correctly understood their arguments (given that judges generally 
read a translation, and not the original submission). It equally gave the general public an 
opportunity to grasp the implications of a pending case. If measured against these dual 
objectives, the recent decision enshrined in the new rules of procedure for the Court to abandon 
the preparation of the report of the hearing is regrettable. 182 This occurred presumably due to the 
significant amount of resources required not only to draft but also translate this document whose 
“added value” has been severely questioned over the years.183 The GC has not abandoned – at 
least not yet – the report for the hearing, which is still made accessible on the day of the hearing 
                                                          
173 See <news.sky.com/info/supreme-court> (last visited 15 Nov. 2013). 
174 As of 19/03/2013. 
175 Owen Bowcott, “TV cameras to be allowed into court of appeal’, The Guardian, 30 Jan. 2013. 
176 See <www.youtube.com/user/STF/videos?view=0> (last visited 15 Nov. 2013). 
177 See <www.c-span.org/Events/Bill-Would-Allow-Cameras-in-the-Supreme-Court/10737428169/> (last visited 15 
Nov. 2013). 
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to all individuals present in the courtroom, and can also be obtained from the Press and 
Information Service.184 
 
4.2.3 Access to the preliminary report 
Another significant set of information is contained in the preliminary report.185 Unlike the report 
for the hearing, this is not an official document, but a mere preparatory document established by 
the Judge Rapporteur once the written phase is completed. This document is presented and 
discussed in the weekly general meeting of the CJ and the regular meetings of the GC and CST 
and represents the only opportunity for all members to examine the importance of the case. It 
typically contains a set of recommendations about how to handle the subsequent instruction of 
the case: a proposal for the formation to which the case should be assigned, various 
recommendations regarding the necessity to organize a preparatory inquiry or other preparatory 
measures, regarding whether to dispense with a hearing or, at the CJ, an opinion of the Advocate 
General. Similar to any preparatory document, this deserves to be protected to ensure some 
“space to think” for the jurisdiction. This type of document is, also in the case of other EU 
institutions, exempt from the obligation of disclosure, in accordance with Article 4(3) of 
Regulation 1049/2001. In any event, such document pertains more to the judicial tasks of the 
court, and thus falls squarely within the exemption provided for in Article 15(4) TFEU. Indeed, 
disclosing the initial thoughts of the opinion of the Judge Rapporteur on the substance of the case 
would encroach on the margin of judicial assessment enjoyed by Court members (in particular 
the Judge Rapporteur) and could threaten the principle of secrecy of deliberation. 
 
4.2.4 Access to deliberations  
Throughput openness is limited by the secrecy of deliberations as stemming from Article 35 of 
the Statute.186 By virtue of the exception provided for in Article 15(3) TFUE, the extension of the 
principle of openness to the CJEU is not set to change this situation. Despite the fact that this 
provision is likely to give rise to significant changes (such as the adoption of the decision on 
access to administrative court documents) in the way the Court interacts with the public, it does 
not question per se the raison d’être of the principle of secrecy of deliberations. As a result, it 
appears improbable that the CJEU and the Member States would decide in the future to do so, by 
amending the Statute, since public access to the deliberations might restrict the serenity of legal 
proceedings and expose judges to external pressure. 
 If opening up deliberations does not seem required to ensure the overall openness of the 
Court’s proceedings, a way to increase throughput openness could be to allow dissenting 
opinions.187 These may indeed allow the public – more than a judgment fictionally written by a 
unanimous choir of voices – to grasp information from the debate judges had on particular points 
of law. According to many, this is the function that is already played by the opinions of 
Advocates General.188 Regardless of the merits of these claims, two main arguments, one of a 
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legal and the other of a political nature, have historically constrained such a debate. The legal 
argument claims that the publication of a judge’s opinion departing from the views of the 
majority in a case would question all the values protected by the secrecy of deliberations 
principle. A dissenting opinion would inherently question the authority of the court, its 
collegiality and unity, as well as the independence of each of its members.189 The political 
obstacle is the renewable character of the mandate of the judges: dissenting opinions might be 
introduced only once the mandate is rendered non-renewable to avoid the strategic use of 
dissenting opinions to ensure renewal.190 The debate about dissenting opinions will never 
advance as long as the principle of secrecy of deliberations and the possibility for renewable 
mandates remain. 
 
4.2.5. Evaluation 
Throughput openness could be immediately improved at a limited cost by broadcasting the 
hearings as well as facilitating access to the (already available) minutes and recordings, while 
keeping in mind the necessity to protect confidentiality when required. Unfortunately, 
abandoning the report for the hearing at the level of the Court of Justice constitutes a rather 
infelicitous decision from the perspective of the principle of openness as enshrined in Article 
15(1) TFEU. Finally, in order to alleviate the potential burden on openness caused by the 
established principle of secrecy of deliberations, alternative solutions should be envisaged, such 
as, for example, openly discussing the impact that dissenting opinions may have on the overall 
openness of the Court. 
 
4.3 Output openness 
 
Output openness relates to the final stage of a proceeding in front of EU Courts.191 As such, its 
normative essence consists in guaranteeing access to the judgments, orders, and opinions of the 
Courts.192 The Courts’ outputs are notified to the parties to the dispute – as a part of their right to 
fair trial.193 The new Article 22(3) of the CJ Rules of Procedure extends the right to obtain 
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certified copies of judgments and orders to third parties. Output openness requires a wider 
distribution of the Courts’ judgments, orders and opinions, such as that accomplished through 
publication thereof in the European Court Reports and on the Court website. 
 
4.3.1 Publication of outputs 
The requirement to publish judgments of all courts varies across jurisdictions and is intrinsically 
related to the local legal culture. Common law countries, based on a system of precedent, have 
published judgments since the thirteenth century;194 in civil law countries, publicity of judgments 
was introduced much later, with the practice of consistently communicating court decisions 
dating back only to the seventeenth century in France.195 As evidenced by empirical studies, 
precedent plays an important role in EU law, and the impact of judicial decisions transcends the 
underlying dispute.196 Therefore, publication of the case law of EU Courts is vital, and needs to 
be ensured by intervention of the public authority. The case law of the Court is published – a task 
entrusted also to the Registrar.197 The authentic version of the judgments, orders, and opinions is 
published in the European Court Reports in paper version,198 although some cases may be 
exempted from publication.199 However, as access to electronic versions of the cases is more 
adapted to the current needs of information as well as less costly, the CJEU recently decided to 
abandon the paper version and embrace the digital source. Such access is ensured free of charge 
on the CURIA webpage and the text of the decisions published online are authentic in the 
language of procedure. Exempting cases from publication in the ECR has important 
consequences from a linguistic point of view, as many cases are often not translated in other 
languages than French, restricting the access thereto considerably for those that do not speak this 
language (see section 4.3.2. below). 
 The new and improved search engine of the Court, InfoCuria, offers the possibility to 
undertake searches of the case law of the European Courts. This enhanced dramatically the 
transparency of judicial output, as previously electronic case law search was split between Eur-
lex (for the judgments, orders and opinions issued before 1997) and Curia (for the judgments, 
orders and opinions issued after 1997). Moreover, the opinions of the Advocates General were 
uploaded to CELEX only starting in October 1987.200 Even though they have been progressively 
incorporated,201 the task to retrieve all pre-1987 opinions used to be a complicated one, as they 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Voermans, “Judicial transparency furthering public accountability for new judiciaries”, 3 Utrecht Law Review 
(2007), 148-159. 
194 Seipp, “Medieval English Legal History – An Index and Paraphrase of Printed Year Book Reports, 1268 – 1535”, 
available online at <www.bu.edu/law/seipp/> (last visited 15 Nov. 2013). For a different account, see Godding, 
“Jurisprudence et motivation des sentence, du moyen âge à la fin du 18e siècle”, in Perelman and Foriers (Eds.), La 
motivation des décisions de justice (Bruylant, 1978); Sauvel, “Histoire du jugement motivé”, 61 Revue du droit 
public (1955), 5 et seq. 
195 J. P. Dawson, The Oracles of the Law (The University of Michigan Law School, Ann Arbor, 1968), at p. 305. 
196 See e.g. Stone Sweet, “The European Court and Integration”, in Stone Sweet (Ed.), The Judicial Construction of 
Europe (OUP, 2004), Chs. 3 and 4; Bengoetxea, “The scope for discretion, coherence, and citizenship”, in Wiklund 
(Ed.), Judicial Discretion in European Perspective (Kluwer, 2007). 
197 Art. 20 Rules of Procedure of the CJ, Art. 86 Rules of Procedure of the GC; Art. 19 Rules of Procedure of the 
CST. 
198 As per the disclaimers present on the Curia webpage “the texts of the judgments, orders, opinions and notices 
present on the site are subject to amendment; only the versions published in the ECR or the O.J. are authentic.” See 
<curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/T5_5135/> (last visited 15 Nov. 2013). 
199 Following the 2004 enlargement, a policy of selective publication of judgments and orders was adopted. 
200 According to the CELEX Reference Manual, 68. 
201 Brown and Kennedy, The Court of Justice of the European Communities,5th ed. (Sweet & Maxwell, 2000), p.32. 
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were not all available in Eur-Lex. In order to palliate this difficulty for early Advocate General 
opinions, the research needed to be conducted through fee-based databases such as Westlaw.  
Since online availability of judicial outputs is critical to ensuring openness, 202 the recent efforts 
in this direction should be praised. Access to unofficial versions of the EU Courts judgments is 
relatively easy for people who have access to the Internet, and the Court’s output transparency 
fares well from this point of view. However, not all case law is translated in all the EU 
languages, making access difficult – and at times impossible – for some linguistic versions. 
 
4.3.2 Lost in translation 
Language is sometimes an obstacle to accessing the EU Courts’ case law, given that not all 
judgments are translated and/or published. Traditionally, the language of deliberation is French, 
the internal working language of the Court.203 Most of the judgments should be in principle 
translated in all official languages, while giving priority to the language of the case, which is 
deemed the authentic version.204 Because of the high number of cases that required translation, 
the Court was often confronted with problems that led to backlogs in the publication of other 
language versions than French.205 Until 1994 the delay between the publication of the French and 
English versions of the orders and judgments (in cases in which English was not the procedural 
language) took up to two years.206 Another consequence stemming from the high volume of 
translations was the decision to publish from 1989 to 1991 some cases only in their summary 
form. The full texts were made available only in the language of the case and the opinions of the 
Advocates General only in the language in which they were delivered.207 
 Following the 2004 enlargement, a policy of selective publication in the ECR was 
adopted.208 This was because, on the one hand, the accessibility of case law was jeopardized by 
the large amount of published material and, on the other hand, it was extremely difficult to 
organize translation in all the official languages.209 At the CJ, judgments (other than in 
preliminary ruling proceedings) delivered by Chambers of three judges, or delivered by 
Chambers of five judges ruling without an opinion from the Advocate General, as well as Court 
orders, are exempt from publication unless otherwise decided by the relevant Chamber.210 At the 
level of the GC, the decision to publish judgments of Chambers of three judges is made on a 
case-by-case basis by the Chamber itself, which results in different translation policies.211 In 
these circumstances, drawing up a set of common criteria for translations would be 
commendable. Yet, given the differences in composition of the chambers (the default is 5-judge 
chamber at the CJ and 3-judge chamber) this might not be easy to attain. Also, those judgments 
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decided by a single judge and GC orders are not published in the ECR, unless decided 
otherwise.212 Unpublished judgments and orders are accessible on the CURIA web site in the 
language of the case and the language of deliberation.213 Nevertheless, there is case law that does 
not necessarily follow these publication rules, as some previously decided cases are published 
only in an abridged form in English. In these situations, one has to rely on the French version 
available on the ECR for a more complete version. Moreover, the judgments do not bear any 
indication as to the completeness of the translation, and only after a very careful reading can one 
realize that entire paragraphs are missing from the text.214 
 Documents drawn up in the language of the case, or any other language authorized by the 
Courts, are deemed authentic.215 In delivering their opinions, Advocates General may use a 
language other than the language of the case.216 This means that only the text of the judgment in 
the language of the case and the opinion of the Advocate General in the language in which it was 
officially delivered are authentic.217 
 
4.3.3 Transparency of statistics 
The CJ began publishing reports of activity in 1972,218 almost twenty years after its inception. 
Some of these reports contain the disclaimer that they are meant for information only and cannot 
be quoted as official publications of the Court. Moreover, they are not always consistent in 
statistically recording the case law.  
 Several reports do not give any details as to the number of cases decided yearly according 
to the field.219 While they might provide some information concerning the breakdown of cases 
per large sectors of activity such as “competition”, “external relations”, “free movement of 
capital”, etc., a subsector breakdown of cases has not been compiled to date. For instance, if one 
is interested in the number of cases dealing with subsectors of activity, such as the motor 
vehicles industry, distribution agreements, or banking, one would need to estimate the number by 
oneself. Such enterprise has been recently rendered more feasible by InfoCuria, which allows a 
“sector search” option. However, providing more detailed statistics in the annual report would 
allow a more accurate perspective on the work of the Court.  
 Moreover, there is inconsistency in the way in which the cases are counted. Until 2002, 
the annual reports presented the gross and net number of judgments, orders and opinions issued 
by the Courts - that is, both the figures that do not take into account the cases joined on grounds 
of similarity and the figures that do take joined cases into account. Since 2002, only the gross 
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number of cases is presented in the reports, meaning that each case is counted, even though a 
single judgment, order or opinion was issued in several joined cases.  
 
4.3.4. Evaluation 
The several shortcomings in the ways in which the Courts’ output is translated, recorded and 
quantified illustrate that the principle of openness is not fully satisfied by granting free access on 
the Internet to case law databases. While Internet availability can satisfy the need for access to 
particular case law in a timely manner, it should be recalled that not all judgments are translated 
in all the official languages, and that mastery of some other EU official language, typically 
French or English, remains sometimes essential. Moreover, not all judgments are completely 
published on the webpage. Also, due to inconsistencies in the official statistics, a clear 
perspective of the CJEU’s activities as an institution is missing. 
 The problems presented in this section also affect legal scholars engaged in empirical 
studies as well as the historian or any other researcher committed to data collection. Gathering 
complete data is not a straightforward enterprise, given the language limitations, and the fact that 
the keyword searches either retrieve a lot of irrelevant hits or do not retrieve all relevant material, 
when complex queries and Boolean operators are employed. We submit that this is not just an 
issue of dry academic methodology. Indeed, even though facilitating empirical research should 
not constitute a priority for the Court, enabling academics and legal professionals to better 
explain judicial work to the public might have a positive impact from an openness point of view. 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
Opening the activities of the Court to the public has to be done within the limits set by Article 
15(3) TFEU: the rules on access to documents apply to the CJEU only when it exercises 
administrative functions, and do thus not apply to the exercise of judicial activities. This 
exception is justified by the necessity to ensure that the act of delivering judgments is protected 
from external interference. Commendably, in February 2013 a decision was published regulating 
access to the CJEU’s documents held in the exercise of its administrative functions. This article 
argued that in the interest of openness and legal certainty, further legislative action is needed to 
distinguish between the Courts’ judicial and administrative tasks, in order to ensure the exact 
limits of the Article 15(3) exception. Failing to do so, it will be left to the case law to define the 
issue. In any event, certain institutional adjustments need to be made in order to guarantee more 
openness in carrying out the Courts’ administrative tasks. 
 While our analysis demonstrates that the EU Courts score quite well from an openness 
point of view at the input, throughput, and output stages of the judicial activity, it also shows that 
they still face several important challenges. These relate, among others, to the limited third-party 
access to the case file and to substantial background information regarding the cases, the 
difficulty to attend hearings outside of the Court premises, as well as the partial translation of 
certain material. One of the most important challenges is closely connected to the principle of 
multilingualism, and the Court will have to find a way to reconcile the existing language policy 
with requirements of openness, in the context of limited translation resources and an increasing 
complexity and variety of substantive legal issues addressed submitted for its judgment. The 
Court could also enhance its links with the media by making use of popular platforms of 
communication and by streaming online webcasts of hearings.  
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 While the CJEU is manifestly no longer “tucked away in the fairyland Duchy of 
Luxembourg” as famously depicted by Eric Stein,220 it needs to continue its struggle to exit the 
antiquated era characterized by grey areas, shadows and a lot of print and dusty paper. The 
growing public attention, generated by the reformed judicial appointment system,221 the 
threatening social media as well as a ballooning blogosphere222 is progressively bringing the 
Court’s internal work under the spotlight. In these circumstances, it is the time for the EU’s 
judicial body to take seriously the openness requirement as it stems from Article 15 TFEU. The 
recent decision on access to documents, the reshuffling of the Curia search platform, as well as 
the brand new Twitter account (available in English and in French) are signs that the Court is 
progressively adapting to the zeitgeist of openness and transparency.  
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